

# ACFA: Secure Runtime Auditing and Guaranteed Device Healing via Active Control Flow Attestation

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## Remote Microcontroller Units (MCUs)

Resource-constrained MCUs are deployed in a wide range of modern systems but lack system security features to prevent exploits.



## Secure Auditing of Remote MCU's

Can we **remotely audit** the behavior of a remotely deployed (and potentially compromised) MCU?

### Security requirements of runtime auditing:

1. Generate authentic/accurate evidence of the exact runtime behavior.
2. Reliably deliver evidence for analysis.
3. Remotely remediate detected compromises.

## Control Flow Attestation (CFA)

A device operator (Vrf) requests reliable evidence of a remote MCU's (Prv) behavior.

Prv responds with proof of the code and all control flow transfers that executed.

Vrf determines valid or malicious behavior.




## From Attestation to Auditing

What if a compromised Prv ignores requests from Vrf?

**Prior CFA:** Nothing!

**Why:** Absence of response => compromise => enough for attestation goal.




**But:** Absence of response *prevents auditing* - cannot analyze evidence!

**Additionally:** Intervention to remedy Prv compromise must be physical.


## Our Work: ACFA - Active Control Flow Attestation

- Reliable communication of evidence implemented within ACFA's TCB
  - Hardware-protected *active* generation of evidence
  - Trigger-based attestation and transmission of evidence to Vrf.
  - ACFA TCB (within Prv) waits for authenticated approval of evidence from Vrf (retransmitting evidence periodically) before resuming untrusted execution.
- Active Remediation (in case of compromise detection):
  - Vrf-specified healing action is guaranteed to execute on Prv.




## Prototype and Evaluation

Deployed on a Basys3 prototyping board equipped with an Artix-7 FPGA.



- ACFA hardware requires 275 Look-up tables (LUTs) and 202 Flip-Flop registers (FFs)
- No runtime overhead to record control flow transfers.



## Resources

See our paper (USENIX Security '23) here:



ACFA open-source prototype available here:



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