Cybersecurity Assessment & Compliance Strategy for a Non-Profit Organization

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Introduction

Non-profit organizations provide a variety of services to the public. In doing so, these non-profit organizations often obtain and share sensitive and Personal Identifiable Information (PII) (Bruce, 2020, p. 4). Often operating with limited budgets and relying on grants and federal funding, these organizations often encounter difficulty implementing adequate safeguards to prevent data breaches, and further lack the resources and knowledge to react appropriately in the event of such a breach (Founders Technology Group, LLC, 2020). The impact of such a breach, if identified, could have significant consequences of the organization's ability to provide its services, by both hindering operations, and having State law consequences which can force a shut-downs of operations due to the size of monetary penalties (de Groot, 2021). As such, the goal of this project is to assess the business processes and tools of a small South Florida non-profit organization, identify gaps and risks in how they work with client information, and to provide the non-profit with an Information Security and compliance strategies. This information security policies will outline the steps needed to protect user data in storage and in transit, and the compliance strategy will outline ways in which the non-profit organization can maintain and test for adherence to state and federal regulations related to the handling of PII.

Problem

The problem which this project will focus on is privileged account compromise. Privilege account compromise occurs when one or more accounts holding elevated access to critical systems and data is compromised (Gegick, Barnum, 2013). There are several ways the account can be compromised; it can occur through the unintended installation of malware, fraudulent emails, fraudulent login sites, keylogging, phishing, and brute force (Linden, 2019). Once the user with elevated access has their account compromised, the account can be used to perform cyberattacks directly, or to create and elevate access to additional accounts and processes for even broader access to internal systems. Cyberattacks related to privileged accounts and elevated access are quite common. In fact, it has been reported that nearly all damaging cyberattacks involved privileged account compromise (Linden, 2019, p. 1). As reported at the start of the COVID 19 pandemic, the number of severe ransomware attacks increased, with several ACT-1 government and hospital entities falling victim to these attacks (Waldman, 2021). The key detail, however, identified as the root cause for most of these attacks is that a highly privileged individual had their account compromised and provided the attackers with the initial point of entry. Once the attackers gain access via the privileged account, they proceed to elevate access to additional users and ACT-2 resources, resulting in what is described as an irreversible network takeover attack (Linden, 2019). In fact, of the top 10 ransomware attacks of 2021, the 3rd largest attack was to CNA Financial, which is one of the largest insurance carriers in the U.S. It cost the company two months of downtime and \$40 million dollars to recover, as CNA paid the ransom requested as a last resort (Waldman, 2021).

Facts

This project proposal will focus on a small non-profit organization named Auxilio. This organization obtains federal funds and grants to provide services to migrant workers and their families. The services include childcare, rent assistance, education and language services, immigration services, social work, food and clothing. The organization runs with limited internal resources; between three locations there are a total of 15 employees providing services, with occasional assistance from student volunteers. Of the 15 employees, there are no dedicated Information Technology (IT) or Infosec resources. Instead, ACT -5 the organization relies on a single, private company with one IT resource. This technical resource administers server maintenance, server access, storage allocation and access, hardware and software ACT-6 (Cameras, logbook, doorlocks) maintenance, security escalations requests. As there is very little IT knowledge within the organization, this external resource has been provided with the proverbial 'keys to the kingdom' and has admin/system level access to all technology resources in the organization. Support services are often provided remotely via remote desktop sessions, without the usage of a secure VPN connection. The liaison to this external resource is the executive assistant/program manager/business advisor. Along with the external IT resource, she also has access to most of the passwords (not all). Individual user security access is managed ad-hoc, as the organization has no policies or recommendations to employees related to passwords. There are no minimum passwords enforced, and no cycle in place requiring routine updates to system passwords. System access is limited to the individual systems that the employees use and allocated network resources. Some employees (specifically accounting and program manager) have remote access via Windows remote desktop (and RDT services for Windows server). Types of sensitive information that employees work with on a daily basis include social security numbers, work permit numbers, names, addresses, and income information. It has been explained that Social Security information is not retained electronically; the individual information is uploaded into a web-accessible application which then provides a unique ID for the individuals, with additional documents stored on network drives and email. In regard to current strategies for managing risk and compliance, the organization does have a disaster recovery plan, however this plan is limited to employee contact information and procedures in the event of an office closure. The initiation of the emergency/incident response plan fall on the Director, as well as the business advisor/program manager and contacts throughout the satellite locations. In total, four individuals are authorized to initiate the incident response plan. The details within the disaster recover plan are audited routinely every September.

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Project Scope & Goals

The goal of this project is to develop an IT Security Policy and Compliance plan for a non-profit. The scope of the policy will focus heavily on system and resource access following the principle of least privilege, implementation of controls related to passwords and network resource usage, and the centralization of important secrets/details within the organization. The

 Category	Subcategory
Governance	ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity policy is established and communicated
Governance	ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes address cybersecurity risks
Risk Assessment	ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented
Awareness & Training	PR.AT-2: Privileged users understand their roles and responsibilities
Data Security	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected
Maintenance	PR.MA-2: Remote maintenance of organizational assets is approved, logged, and performed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access
Protective Technology	PR.PT-3: The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities
Security Continuous Monitoring	DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events
Detection Processes	DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for detection are well defined to ensure accountability

Action Description	Туре	Goal
Policy	Managerial	MG-1
nical staff on the new requirement for remote connections	Managerial	MG-2
for internal users and 3rd party vendors for system	Managerial	MG-3
Policies	Managerial	MG-4
tions, ensuring Policy of Least Privelage (PoLP)	Managerial	MG-5
Recovery plan	Managerial	MG-6
ties to identify critical data that needs to be restored	Managerial	MG-7
Installation Policy	Managerial	MG-8
Usage Policy	Managerial	MG-9
Communication Policy	Managerial	MG-10
on of network segmentation to ensure data separation along		
	Technical	TG-1
strict direct access to sensitive systems and facility.	Managerial	MG-11

bod of	Impact to the	Proposed Mitigation Plan	Action
ance	Organization		ltem
		Implement password policies regarding shared	
		accounts, password length, complexity, and password	
gh	High	expiration to prevent unauthorized access.	
		Implementation of NIST Password Protection Policy and	
		annual Cyber Awareness training	ACT-1
		Immodiate implementation of liability clause as well as	
gh	High	requirement for insurance in the event of a breach	
		Implementation and Training on Remote Access Policy	ACT-2
		Moving of all backs to a separate room/location to	
		ensure viability in the event of a disaster/catastrphic	
ium	High	failure. Implementation of Disaster recovery policy and	
		action plan	ACT-3
ium	High		
Ium	Ingi		
		Implementation of Software Installation Policy	ACT-4
		Implement Wireless Communication Standard policy	
ium	High	with regards to adding personal devices to network,	
		establish updated wiff encryption (WPA-PSK or WPA-2)	
		Contract a cocurity company to provide onsite cocurity	ACT-5
		services. Implement CCTV surveillance to deter threat	
W	High	actors Implement key card access control to secure	
		locations where sensitive information is stored	ACT-6
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Equipment/ IS Policy Item	Internal/ External labor	Action ID	Cost Per Item/HR	Quantity/ Hrs	Total
Implementation of Password Protection policy	External	ΔCT-1	\$125	3	\$375
Cyber Awareness Training on All	External			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Implemented Policies and					
Compliance	External	ACT-1	\$125	20	\$2,500
Implementation of Remote Access	Extornal		¢125	2	ĊŊŢĘ
Implementation of AD groups	External	ACT-2	\$125	5	<u> </u>
ensuring Policy of Least Privilege					
(PoLP)	External	ACT-2	\$175	15	\$2,625
Implementation of Disaster Recovery Policy and Incident Response Plan Implementation of Software	External	ACT-3	\$125	5	\$625
Installation Policy	External	ACT-4	\$125	3	\$375
Implementation of Internet Usage Policy	External	ACT-4	\$125	3	\$375
Updated WiFi solution	External	ACT-5	\$800	1	\$800
Updated WiFi solution Administration	External	ACT-5	\$125	8	\$1,000
Logbook for Server Room Access	External	ACT-6	\$20	1	\$20
Security Cameras	External	ACT-6	\$100	4	\$400
Security Company (Annual cost)	External	ACT-6	\$1,200	1	\$1,200
Biometric lock for server room (Nest lock, provides management of					
multiple users and logging online)	Internal	ACT-6	\$279	1	\$279
				Grand Total :	\$10,949

In conclusion, this project proposal thorough identifies Auxilio's immediate high priority risks related to user access and data transmission. Through the action plan defined via thorough analysis using the NIST framework and risk identification/mitigation strategies, it is possible to elevate the security posture of Auxilio from Tier 1, which is Partial, to Tier 2, which is Risk informed. In doing so, the organization would be better equipped to respond to identify and respond to potential threats. Finally, the final policy and compliance strategy will enable the organizations leaders to be more proactive in identifying key risks and securing their data to the benefit of the community which they serve.

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Anticipated Results

t is expected that the results of the recommended changes will provide a significant drop in high-risk activities, while in-itself providing management with a lot of insight in regard to how the organizational resources are being used. As a non-profit reliant on government funding and grants, this visibility should significantly reduce risks providing significant information and abilities to recover critical data in the event of catastrophic loss

Proposed Costs

Conclusion

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